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ABSTRACT In this article, we set out the basic points of the theoretical
framework of voter choice that underlie the Opinion '99 research project. In
contrast to prevailing theories that have characterized voter choice in South
Africa as an ethnic or racial census, this approach emphasizes the role of how
voters learn about government performance and the alternatives offered by
opposition parties. We then deduce a very simplified model that consciously
excludes all 'structural' variables and includes only measures of voter evalua-
tions of government performance and views of political parties and candidates.
We use discriminant analysis (DA) to predict the partisan preferences of
respondents from a nationally representative September 1998 survey with these
measures. We find that the partisan choices of a very large majority of South
Africans can be correctly predicted with this model.
If people are to govern themselves in any meaningful way, they must be able to
control their elected representatives and make government respond to their
wishes. Periodic elections provide the most basic and accessible way in which
citizens can accomplish this. But for elections to act as a vehicle of popular
control over the day-to-day actions of government, citizens must be willing and
able to base their vote on whether they are satisfied with what government is
doing. They must also be ready to change their vote. Without the threat of losing
or gaining votes, and thus losing or winning, governments and opposition parties
have no incentive to anticipate the reactions of public opinion to what they do,
and the prospects of popular self-government diminish rapidly.
Against these imperatives, one could conclude that democracy in South Africa
faces a bleak future if one were to judge by the weight of scholarly opinion.
Prominent analysts of South African politics worry about South Africa sliding
towards a one-party dominant pattern in which most voters are deeply committed
to political parties, where there is no 'undecided middle', and thus little or no
prospect for electorally induced change in government.1
One underlying reason for these worries is the post-colonial, or more mod-
estly, newly independent nature of South African society. In such societies,
especially in Africa, it is argued that liberation parties who win first elections
continue to win re-election from increasingly large majorities. Opposition parties
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become demoralized largely because voters do not vote on the basis of issues,
performance or governance, but rather flock to the dominant party to get
patronage or because of sheer bandwagoning.2
Another factor underlying these fears is the deeply divided nature of South
Africa's society. In a widely influential book, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Donald
Horowitz has characterized elections in deeply divided societies as ethnic
censuses.3 In these societies, elections are the result of 'ascriptive voting'; voting
determined by (or at least largely shaped by) birth or descent, rather than by a
conscious consideration of party programmes or incumbent performance. Voters
do not register choice, but identity. They 'choose, in effect, not to choose but to
give their vote predictably on an ethnic basis to an ethnically defined party'.
Because, ethnic voters 'put voters of the other group who do choose among
parties at a collective disadvantage', ethnic votes tend to drive out non-ethnic
votes.4 Horowitz's 'census' analogy has had a powerful influence on analysts of
divided societies, as well as on many politicians within those societies. This has
certainly been true of South Africa where a wide range of domestic political
analysts, as well as prominent visiting observers such as Giovanni Sartori, have
explained the results of its historic founding 1994 election as an 'ethnic' or a
'racial census'.5
South African analysts have pointed to aggregate voting results, as well as
previous and ensuing opinion polls to argue that voters in South Africa are
driven largely by either the desire to express national or communal liberation
and independence, or to display communal solidity with political parties seen to
represent that community, or by the fear of communal pressure and intoler-
ance—or some combination of all three.6 The clear implication is that communal
interests or pressures supersede other voter concerns, so much so that voters may
actually vote against their interests, opinions or preferences, or at least irrespec-
tive of them. Election events become elections only in the most formal sense.
Election results reflect demographic distributions, or ethnic or racial censuses,
rather than popular preferences.
While the 'census' image may provide a useful description of elections in
divided societies, as an explanation of individual voting behaviour the census
theory suffers from a range of methodological and theoretical problems.7
Nonetheless, one cannot deny the clear and unmistakable relationship between
race and ethnicity and voting patterns in South Africa's national and local
elections thus far. The key question is, however, how we interpret these
correlations. Quite simply, correlation does not equal causation. There is no
necessary relationship between the size of the correlation between ethnicity and
the vote and the existence or absence of ethnically motivated voting. Identifying
the covariance of demographic factors with voting patterns does not constitute
a satisfactory social scientific explanation of individual behaviour and motiv-
ation. As Christopher Achen has argued, correlations between demographic
factors and the vote do not explain the vote; rather they themselves need to be
explained. Instead, we need to ask, 'what is it about a given demographic factor








































































JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE IN THE 1999 ELECTION
A more satisfactory understanding of how South Africans vote requires us to
focus on voters, their motivations, their preferences, how they learn and how
they reason. To be sure, we also need to take into account how voter reasoning
may be affected by the environment and context in which they find themselves.
It also requires collecting appropriate data with which to operationalize and test
such a theory. This was the approach underlying the Opinion '99 project, an
election research consortium of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa
(Idasa), the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA), Markinor, and the South
African Broadcasting Corporation.9 In this article, we lay out that theoretical
approach and test some very initial, simple deductions of this approach with
survey data collected by Opinion '99 in the recent election campaign.
Reasoning, information and partisan choice
We proceed from the assumption that voters support parties and candidates who
they think will govern best in the future.10 In order to figure out which party can
best do this, voters use information. Many analysts will immediately point to
citizens' low levels of information about politics and government. However,
'information' means not only factual, textbook information but also much more
general knowledge and understanding of what has happened, how things are
going, and what is responsible for how things are going. While voters may not
be very well informed, this does not mean that they do not reason. All that is
meant by a reasoning voter is that, in Achen's words:
Voters do not ignore the information they have, do not fabricate information they do not
have, and do not choose what they do not want. Thus, the voters need be neither geniuses
nor saints. They are required only to do the best with the information they have."
South Africans do not have to be avid readers of Business Day, or regularly
listen to 'PM Live' in order to become informed. They can use whatever
information is available to them, and where there is no information, either draw
inferences from what they do know, or look to the views of other people or
sources whom they think do know, what Samuel Popkin calls 'low information
reasoning'.12 And one key source of information is the past behaviour (or 'track
record') of a government, political party or candidate. In fact, information about
what candidates and parties have done in the past is often a better and more
reliable guide to how they will behave in the future than what they promise they
will do.
For governing parties, the track record of the current administration is
extremely important. Voters can reach some sort of summary judgement about
how things have been going, and the reasons why, and use that to draw
conclusions about how things will go in the future. In order to figure this out,
voters are able to get a great deal of relevant information about these things from
everyday life. As consumers, people know whether prices are going up or down,
and whether salaries are keeping up. If they buy anything on hire-purchase,
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they know whether the government is taking more taxes this year than last, and
whether the standard of public services has improved or deteriorated. As
workers, they have some idea whether jobs are more or less secure than they
were the previous year. By just looking around, they can also know many things
about the conditions of the neighbourhood and streets, and whether more or
fewer houses appear to be going up.13
Yet it is also important to note that people are not simple 'Pocketbook
Voters'. To the extent that they base their assessment of government perform-
ance on the economy, they tend to look to the larger economy of the community,
province, or nation, not to whether they are personally better or worse off.14 This
is because it is difficult to isolate the government's responsibility for your own
personal fortunes separately from what you know about all the other relevant
factors. You may have lost your job because of government cutbacks, or
mismanagement of the economy, but you may also have lost it because of bad
decisions by management, because the boss does not like you, because you took
a job that you were not good at, or just plain bad luck.15 In contrast, it is much
easier to blame or reward the government when you look around and see many
of your friends or neighbours being retrenched, or see lots of new houses going
up, or see new construction projects hiring workers.
Opposition parties also have track records. What did they do the last time they
were in government? What have they done while out of power in terms of
representing you, articulating your interests, or exposing government failures?
Even if voters have little other information about a candidate or a party, they still
may be able to work out several things on the basis of a little knowledge of past
history. Knowing whether a candidate was in the military, or police, for
example, might give some insight into whether they are likely to be 'tough on
crime'. Knowing where they stood in the struggle against apartheid, for example,
can also help a voter figure out where that party stands today.
Voters can also look to the style in which candidates and parties campaign. Do
they speak with authority? Do they appear to know what they are talking about?
Do they seem trustworthy? Do they demonstrate any connection with the voters?
Where do they campaign: in city centres, suburbs, townships or squatter camps?
Voters can also learn from the things that candidates and parties say, the stances
that they take, and the promises that they make during an election campaign
(what one might call the 'substance' of the campaign). A final important source
of information voters can use to reason who might govern best, is simple
demographics. Given no other information about a candidate or a party, a voter
can look at things like skin colour, ethnic features, language, accent or even the
way a candidate dresses to infer whether it is likely that the candidate, or their
party, knows anything, or cares about his or her problems or the problems of
their community.
Reasoning in context








































































JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE IN THE 1999 ELECTION
do not arise or endure because people are simply a product of their background,
or because they simply do what their group or community tells them to do.
Rather, since the first voting studies, we have known that voters' perceptions are
shaped by the social context in which they receive, filter and interpret infor-
mation.16 People understand politics by asking how a given government, policy,
or issue is likely to affect them and people like them. They answer this question,
not in isolation, but by speaking to family, neighbours or friends, and by
listening to political parties and the news media engage in the crucial process of
taking credit and laying blame. People interpret and understand what they know
or hear about government and political parties through the 'lenses' of their
present circumstances, and through the eyes of the news media and of those they
work with, live next to, or socialize with (what social scientists call 'information
networks').17
Given the plethora of things that come over the news everyday, we need ways
to simplify political reality. Thus, the opinions of trusted sources of information
become a valuable 'cue' on issues that we do not know about, or a template
against which to test our opinions when we do have some information. These
respected sources or 'cues' might range anywhere from a specific magazine,
newspaper, television or radio station, or specific writer or correspondent, a
community leader, or a respected or knowledgeable friend. Thus, the 'reality' we
comprehend, and our interpretation of its consequences for us, may differ
radically depending upon our present economic and material circumstances, and
where we get our information about politics.
This provides an important clue as to why voting patterns differ so much in
South Africa along lines of race, class, and in a few areas, by language and
rural/urban distinctions. One of the many effects of the Group Areas Act is that
the information networks of vast majorities of black, white, coloured or Indian
voters have been contained for the greatest part wholly within particular cultural
milieux, each of which was fairly internally consistent with few cross-pressures.
Thus, voters' information about their interests and past events (such as apartheid,
the struggle against apartheid, the repeal of apartheid, the transition to democ-
racy, and the first five years of democratic government and delivery) is likely to
have been received through screens, or informational gatekeepers which ran
parallel to race. Thus, voters from different racial groups and different ethnic
communities are likely to have literally seen starkly different political worlds
when they began to think about the 1999 election.
Partisan identification
If there is one thing that we have learned in the past 30 years of election research
it is that most voters do not make up their minds anew in each election, nor do
they make up their minds only when they enter the election booth, or in the last
few days of an election campaign. Most voters tend to have pre-existing
predispositions about which party they 'identify with' or feel close to, predispo-
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Voting scholars originally saw party identification as a largely unchanging
attitude based almost solely on socialization from parents and peers, from which
voters could deviate or 'defect' from in a given election, but usually return to in
the long run.18 Now, however we know that party identification is better
characterized as a voters' 'standing decision' that is constantly updated based on
a voter's evolving evaluations of political parties, leaders and performance.19
At the age of 18, the best sources of such information may indeed be one's
parents or peers. However, the original decision is constantly updated by new
information, information gleaned from observing economic trends visible in
everyday life, from the news media, or from respected friends and colleagues.20
As voters accumulate experience with parties and government, their partisan
identification may change. If their party seems to continue to perform well and
'deliver the goods' (whether as government or in the role of an opposition
expressing your political values and interests), and if you see no better alterna-
tive, you will stick with that party and may even develop a stronger identification
with it. But if your initial loyalties are disappointed, if a party does not perform
well, your loyalties will weaken. If you see a better alternative, you may switch
your loyalties and develop a different partisan identification.
Voters whose experiences have led them to adopt such a 'standing decision'
and identify with a party are much more likely to vote on election day, and are
very likely to vote for that party. These 'independent voters', potentially, are
more open to persuasion in the election campaign and may base their choice on
party stances on the key issues of the day, as well as how leaders and parties
campaign. At the same time, we know that political parties have to work harder
to get independent voters to come out and vote.
Theoretical expectations
What does all this mean for an analysis of voting in the 1999 South African
election? Here, we sketch out broadly a simple model and test it with survey data
from a September 1998 nationally representative survey of 2,200 eligible voters
conducted by Opinion '99.
As a first point of departure, as voters moved closer to the forthcoming 1999
election, their evolving partisan identification (or lack thereof) should have been
a clear reflection of their understandings of what had gone on in the first four
years of democratic government. Principally, this would involve an assessment
of the track record of the governing party, the ANC. In reasoning about this track
record, voters could be expected to have looked primarily to their understanding
of general national economic trends, as well as developments in other more
specific areas, such as employment prospects, housing and crime. These should
have then enabled voters to form a general assessment of how government was
performing, an assessment that should be directly related to their current partisan
stances.
Satisfaction with these trends should help the ANC retain the loyalties of its








































































JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE IN THE 1999 ELECTION
led voters away from the ANC, it would not tell us which opposition party such
voters would move toward, if any.
Those who did not identify with the governing party needed to look to other
types of evaluations in order to decide which opposition party, if any, they might
move toward. As argued above, one important source of information were the
track records of opposition parties: how had they performed as parties, and had
they convinced voters dissatisfied with government performance that they
offered a viable alternative? Those who were dissatisfied with government
performance yet who did not see any alternative among the opposition parties
should be independent. When it comes to deciding who to vote for those who
identify with a party would be expected to be likely to go out and vote, and very
likely to vote for that party. Those who are independent will be less likely to
vote, but those that do will be much more likely to base their vote on 'short-term
forces' such as evaluations of the party's main candidates and a consideration of
how the parties stand on the issues, especially those issues that the independent
voter sees of primary importance.
Empirical analysis
Whilst a full and conclusive analysis of the data collected by Opinion '99 lies
outside of the scope of this article, here we present as simple a model as
possible: a model which also presents a critical test of the approach underlying
the Opinion '99 project, and conversely, of alternative explanations of voting
that emphasize the dominant role of race or ethnicity. Our model consciously
puts as great a weight as possible on voters' evaluations and preferences, and as
little as possible on structural and demographic variables. To what extent can we
statistically account for people's partisan choices (both their partisan
identification as well as their vote choice in a simulated secret election) solely
by reference to their evaluations of national trends, of government performance,
party performance and images, party leaders and issues?
To do this, we use a statistical test called discriminant analysis (DA). DA is
useful to perform multivariate analysis when the dependent variable consists of
a series of unordered, discrete outcomes, such as party identification or vote
choice. DA helps us understand whether and how a series of explanatory
variables (in this case, voters' evaluations) effectively discriminates cases
(voters) into the various categories of the dependent variable (supporting or
voting for various parties).
DA does this first, by calculating a set of functions that help discriminate
cases between the categories of the dependent variable and determining the
relative strength of the independent variables in the process. Second, DA uses
these discriminant functions to predict the group membership of each case. The
rate at which it can assign cases into their correct categories (e.g. political party
support) tells us how powerful the independent variables are in discriminating
cases among various categories. We restrict discussion of the following analysis
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different groups of survey respondents to test the intentionally simplified model
we have described above.
Equation 1 (to support the ANC or not)
First of all, we look among all survey respondents and attempt to assess the
degree to which voter assessments of the economy and government performance
can help us predict whether a voter would identify with the ANC or not. In the
September 1998 survey, Opinion '99 found that 35 per cent of all respondents
identified with the ANC (and thus 65 per cent either identified with an
opposition party or were independent).
Altogether 18 individual variables were entered into the equation measuring
voter assessments of national economic conditions (3), the overall direction of
the country (1), and assessments of general (3) and specific (11) areas of
government performance. In a sense, these variables characterize a fairly
comprehensive referendum on the first five years of democratic government. The
dependent variable of party identification was re-coded as ANC/non-ANC.
Overall, these variables correctly predicts the ANC/non-ANC stance of 77 per
cent of all respondents. Of those who told us they identified with the ANC, the
model correctly placed 77 per cent as ANC. It also correctly classified 83 per
cent of those who did not identify with the ANC. There are no absolute
standards by which to judge the classificatory power of a DA equation. The only
useful evaluation is to consider that this is a substantial improvement in
predictive power over a purely random classification (which, with two cate-
gories, would have a success rate of 50 per cent). When applied to the fully
specified party identification variable (e.g. one with all partisan categories), this
equation successfully classifies 70 per cent of all ANC identifiers, but very low
proportions of other opposition party identifiers. This confirms that a referendum
on the past allows people to decide whether or not to support the government,
but not which opposition party to support or whether to support one. Thus, we
are able to predict successfully the partisan (ANC/non-ANC) tendencies of 77
per cent of voters based on no more than knowledge of their evaluations of
national trends and government performance (see Table 1).
Equation 2 (looking at the alternatives)
Second, we look among only those survey respondents who do not identify with
the ANC (65 per cent of the total sample), to assess the extent to which
assessments of past performance of the opposition parties help account for which
opposition parties they supported or whether they identified with one at all.
We used a set of variables measuring voters' assessments of selected specific
actions of political parties since 1994 (21), of how parties had been performing
their functions as parties (7), and whether they felt parties were representative
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Equation 2 6
Dependent variable: partisan identification §
(among independents and non-ANC identifiers: N = 1430) 2
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(7). Each set of questions was asked about the seven largest parties at that point
(ANC, NNP, DP, IFP, FF, UDM, PAC).
The variation in how people assess these political parties successfully pre-
dicts the partisan preference (or lack thereof) of 88 per cent of all non-ANC-
supporting respondents; 93 per cent of all independent respondents were cor-
rectly classified as such (see Table 1). To put this in context, random assignment
of cases to the party identification variable with 14 categories would have had
an overall success rate of only 7 per cent.
Equation 3 (deciding who to vote for)
Finally, we make a simple assumption that those voters who identified with a
particular political party would choose to vote for it. Our area of interest is, thus,
those voters who did not yet identify with a political party (45 per cent). To what
degree can candidate evaluations, and assessments of which parties are best able
to address voters' most important issues, account for these respondents vote in
a simulated secret ballot?
Thus, we entered seven variables that measured respondents' ratings of each
of the main parties' leaders and eight dummy variables for each party (coded 0
or 1) that measured whether a voter felt that that party (or no party) could best
address what they felt was the most important issue facing the country.
It is important to remember that the election campaign had not yet started in
earnest in September 1998 and thus independent voters should not have begun
to focus on candidates and issues to the extent that they might have by May
1999. Nonetheless, these variables could help successfully predict the national
vote (including whether the respondent was still undecided) of 60 per cent of
independent respondents. A totally random classification would have a success
rate of 7 per cent (see Table 1).
Discussion
We firmly recognize that the assumptions we have made above are extremely
simplistic. Nonetheless this very simplified model of partisan preference forma-
tion also offers a heuristic, critical test of the common wisdom about the role of
structural factors such as race, ethnicity and class. We have fully acknowledged
in the theoretical observations at the beginning of this article that such structural
factors do play important moderating (though by no means determining) roles in
shaping what people know and what they think about politics. Yet given South
African political analysts' continuing emphasis on these factors, it is worthwhile
to test a model that consciously excludes all of these factors.
The simple and fundamental finding is that with absolutely no knowledge of
voters' race, language, or class, we have been able to predict successfully the
partisan tendencies of the vast majority of survey respondents, based on no more
than their evaluations of political performance and economic trends.








































































JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE IN THE 1999 ELECTION
of voting might respond that the success of this model is simply due to the fact
that different racial or ethnic groups supported different parties, and that each
group also had consistent, communally determined evaluations of the political
system that are the consequence of, rather than the cause of, partisan support.
While there could be many responses to this argument, one simple fact will
suffice. It is true that ANC support correlates with a more positive view of the
first five years. It is also true that African voters were much more likely to have
positive views than other voters. However, at the time of this survey in
September 1998, while Africans were more optimistic about the direction of the
country (to take one major example), only 53 per cent felt the country was
headed in the right direction. One-third of all African voters felt it was going in
the wrong direction. And, at that time, only slightly more than one-half of all
African voters identified with the ANC.
The effect of different communal, cultural or economic contexts on political
behaviour is probabilistic, not determinist. Living in a certain neighbourhood,
going to a certain school or church, having a certain level of income or type of
job, and using specific types of news media will all tend to shape how one
perceives political and economic developments, but it certainly does not deter-
mine it.
Even this extremely simplified model demonstrates strong empirical support
for the application to the South African electorate of the theoretical framework
that informed the Opinion '99 project; a framework that weaves together the
most important findings of three themes of international voting research: the
Columbia or 'sociological' approach of Lazarfeld and Berelson, the Michigan or
'social-psychological' approach of Angus Campbell and his colleagues, as well
as the economic or rationalist approach of Downs, Key and Popkin. Thus while
South Africa may indeed be a deeply divided society, we do not need to resort
to particularized theories of dominant party systems, or of post-colonial or
ethnically divided societies to understand the major forces that account for voter
behaviour in this country.
When South African voters decide which political parties to entrust with their
future, they look to real-world events (or at least at those events so perceived)
such as the overall direction of the country and the economy, government
performance, opposition parties, candidates and key issues. Thus political per-
formance matters, and election campaigns matter. Race, class and ethnicity, and
the interactions among them, certainly shape how voters perceive performance
and campaigns. But it may be surprising to some to see just how much we can
understand about voters in this country before we even take account of the
socializing effects of culture, neighbourhood, workplace, living standards or
news media.
These findings focus our attention on three broad dynamics that shaped the
1999 election: (1) the relatively strong public approval of the ANC's record of
performance and delivery in the first five years; (2) the fact that the ANC ran a
very strong election campaign that further increased these positive evaluations in
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confront opposition parties in convincing voters to take them as a real alterna-
tive.
South Africa may indeed face the very real prospect of rigidified party
cleavages which will reify the present partisan configuration, and ensure sus-
tained party dominance. However, in contrast to the usual interpretations, this
prospect is not the result of an electorate filled with ethnically or racially
motivated voters blind to performance of government and political parties, or
their own material interests. Rather, in an extremely racially and economically
stratified society, voters are doing the best they can with what they know (or at
least what they think they know) about how political parties and government
performance affects their interests. If partisan cleavages fail to realign over time,
it will be the result of party leaders' failure to grapple with this basic fact and
to find ways to change what voters know, and how voters perceive them. It will
not be the result of voters being too stubborn to change themselves.
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